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In the field of civil procedure, it is sometimes a struggle to get
practitioners, judges, and scholars to give history the attention it deserves. In many other fields, the analytical significance of history and
past practice are well established in our shared professional culture.
Torts, property, and the other common law subjects, constitutional
law, international law—in these areas and many others, the evolution
and growth of legal doctrines over time form an integral part of the
common understanding of how modern problems should be understood and approached. The collection of doctrines and institutional
practices that govern the field of civil procedure are no less shaped by
their history. But that history rarely informs present debates. There
are a few conspicuous exceptions, the most notable being the doctrine
of personal jurisdiction, which is usually taught in law schools as an
historical exercise in legal process and constitutional common law.
But when it comes to the core doctrines of civil practice and litigation—preclusion, joinder, discovery, pleadings—discussions often
proceed as though the world began in the closing decades of the
twentieth century.
This state of affairs makes the work of scholars like Geoff Hazard
acutely important. Professor Hazard has been at the center of the
world of procedure for half a century. By virtue of that fact alone, he
is well equipped to serve as a living archive of the growth and evolution of the practice of civil litigation—a role that he acknowledged
somewhat wryly in an essay twenty years ago when, writing about the
operation of the Federal Rules on the occasion of their fiftieth anni†
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versary, he began one section by noting, “Remembering as I do how a
1
defense could be conducted under old code pleading . . . .” From his
fifteen-year tenure as Director of the American Law Institute, to his
role as draftsman of model rules on both judicial conduct and professional conduct for the American Bar Association, to his service as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, there are few aspects of
the analytical and institutional business of litigation over the last fifty
years that have not been shaped by his hand.
But the lessons of history go deeper in the work of Geoff Hazard,
for Professor Hazard has been one of a core group of scholars who
have emphasized the historical foundations of civil practice as the
starting point for understanding modern procedure—its shape, its
content, and its direction. Nowhere is this commitment more apparent than in An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, the
magisterial account of the historical origins of the modern class action
2
that Hazard wrote with John Gedid and Stephen Sowle. As one of its
central themes, Binding Effect disaggregates two ideas that are often
taken to be inevitably linked in modern class action doctrine: (1) the
propriety, at the outset, of certifying a proceeding that will allow a
small number of representatives to litigate claims on behalf of a class
of similarly situated individuals; and (2) the binding effect that such a
proceeding will have upon the members of the class when the suit ar3
rives at a judgment. Through a careful study of the origins of representative proceedings in English and American equity practice, Hazard and his coauthors demonstrate that the policies of joinder that
characterize the first question have a provenance and an evolutionary
path distinct from the policies of preclusion and judgments law that
characterize the second. Efforts to merge the two policies over the
years, they show, have never been harmonious. Hazard and his coauthors thus challenge the notion that a court’s choices in constructing a class proceeding ex ante will reliably determine the binding effect that the judgment will have ex post. In so doing, they free modern thinkers to ask more careful and targeted questions about the
permissible and desirable boundaries of a representative proceeding,
1
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unhampered by assumptions concerning the necessary forms of the
class action. For scholars who have attempted to think through the
relationship between preclusion policy and class litigation, the article
4
is an indispensable reference.
That type of effort—to identify the structural features that characterize current doctrine and to challenge the assumption that those
structures are either analytically necessary or historically mandated—is
one of the greatest services that a proceduralist can perform for the
profession. Institutional memories can be short, and investment in the
familiar (path dependence, as it has come to be called) can be a powerful inertial force in conversations about reform. When scholars can
demonstrate which features of current doctrine are the result of conscious and considered trade-offs between competing values and which
are merely vestigial holdovers or the product of outright misconception, courts and reformers can make more informed judgments.
Take, for example, the question of when a collateral attack might
be available to absentees wishing to escape the binding effects of a
class action judgment. This contentious issue has provoked intense
disagreement among scholars and judges in recent years, producing a
5
proliferation of highly theorized responses but no satisfying solution.
The debate has taken shape around an assumption that the Supreme
Court voiced in its only recent statement on the issue, in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, that “a judgment entered in a class action, like any other judgment entered in a state judicial proceeding, is

4
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presumptively entitled to full faith and credit.” As Professor Hazard
and his coauthors trenchantly point out, the Court offered that contestable assumption as the culmination of a long period of equivoca7
tion about the binding effects of class or representative proceedings.
At the very least, the proposition that a class action judgment (or settlement) should be treated “like any other judgment entered in a state
judicial proceeding” requires analytical justification rather than mere
citation to precedent. Had the Court’s intervention on the collateral
attack issue in Matsushita enjoyed the benefit of Hazard’s work, the
current debate might be more focused and productive.
Efforts at institutional reform often suffer from the same lack of
perspective. The current reexamination of pleading standards in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s revolutionary decisions in Bell Atlantic
8
9
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal provides a salient example.
Those rulings have provoked an intense debate over the level of factual
specificity and evidentiary support that a plaintiff should be required
to demonstrate in a complaint before she is permitted to mobilize the
powerful tools of discovery (and thereby secure a more advantageous
posture for settlement). Thus far, that debate has consisted largely of a
back-and-forth discussion about the exigencies of the current civil litigation system, with a particular emphasis on the burdensome costs of
documentary and electronic discovery. Many proposed solutions
would entail a significant restructuring of the obligations and expectations associated with pleading, and data regarding the likely impact of
such changes are often elusive. Past experience with efforts to accomplish reform through substantive pleading standards could help teach
us what sort of data we should be trying to collect, but serious discussion of such earlier efforts has thus far been muted.
Professor Hazard’s expertise on the history of pleading practice is
well known, and it should come as no surprise that his scholarly corpus already offers a perspective on these pressing issues. Over twenty
years ago, Hazard wrote several essays to commemorate the fiftieth
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In one, he described the formal and practical changes to the civil action that the
Rules had brought about and then examined the devices by which
certain elements of the old forms of action had found their way back
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into modern civil practice. In describing the Rules’ revolutionary rejection of fact pleading under the Field Code, Hazard offered an observation that should serve as the starting point for appreciating the
magnitude of the current debate:
In an era in which we have become conditioned to broad discovery, it
is difficult to fully appreciate the effect of having to rely entirely on one’s
own evidentiary resources to establish a claim. In yesteryear, an aggrieved person who did not observe the act that resulted in injury, or
have documentary evidence to prove it, was dependent upon the voluntary cooperation of third party witnesses and the possibility of inculpating extrajudicial admissions by the opposing party. . . . A claimant could
get to trial only by filing a claim that could be prosecuted, and doing
that in turn required being able to formulate a proper complaint. A
properly formulated Field Code complaint had to state the particulars of
the defendant’s acts that caused the injury, and the plaintiff had to know
those particulars in order to plead them. The contrast with Federal
11
Rules procedure is difficult to exaggerate.

With the Twombly and Iqbal rulings, yesteryear has returned. As of this
writing, Professor Hazard has not weighed in publicly on the debate
about what is to be done with pleading standards in their wake. When
he does, we will all benefit from the breadth of his knowledge.
As the saying goes, Geoff Hazard has forgotten more about the
history of civil practice and procedure than most of us will ever learn.
For decades, he has sat at the center of key debates over procedural
reform. As both a student of history and a living embodiment of history’s progress, he reminds us of how much knowledge we must attempt to hold within our grasp in order to do this work well.

10

See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628 (1988).
11
Id. at 633 (footnote omitted).

